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Abstract—This paper considers the problem of sensor attack
detection for multiple operating mode systems, building upon
an existing attack detection method that uses a transient
fault model with fixed parameters. For a multiple operating
mode system, the existing method would have to use the most
conservative model parameters to preserve the soundness in
attack detection, thus not being effective in attack detection for
some operating modes. To address this problem, we propose an
adaptive transient fault model to use the appropriate parameter
values in accordance with the change of the operating mode of
the system. The benefit of our proposed system is demonstrated
using real measurement data obtained from an unmanned
ground vehicle.

I. I NTRODUCTION
As Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) have been widely used
in various areas such as Intelligent Transportation Systems
(ITS), ensuring the safety of such CPS becomes imperative.
Modern CPS are equipped with multiple sensors. Some of
the sensors may be vulnerable to sensor attacks such as
sensor spoofing [1]–[3]. The attacked sensors may provide
malicious data to the system, thus threatening the safety of
the system.
Multiple sensors in CPS can provide redundant sensory
information that can be employed to not only increase the
robustness of the system [4]–[6] but to also defend against
malicious sensor attacks [7]–[10]. For example, the speed
of a vehicle can be measured from GPS, wheel encoders
and IMU separately. This redundant sensory information on
the speed of the vehicle can be used for detecting and/or
masking some sensor attacks. [4] provides a sensor fusion
algorithm for multiple redundant sensor measurements and
the worst-case analysis result for the bounded number of
faulty sensors. [8] provides an attack-resilient version of
[4] considering a sensor communication schedule to limit
the capability of the attacker. [9] extends the sensor fusion
algorithm [4] incorporating measurement history into sensor
fusion. The authors of [7] observe that some sensors can exhibit transient faults in the course of normal system operation
(e.g., GPS in a tunnel, wheel encoder when the wheel slips),
which should not be treated as sensor attacks. [7] proposes a
method to detect sensor attacks based on the transient fault

model, which extends the abstract sensor model in [4] to
differentiate transient faults from non-transient attacks.
From the perspective of the existing sensor attack detection work in [7], we consider systems that have multiple
operating modes in this work. For example, an unmanned
ground vehicle can have different operating modes such
as high-speed and low-speed cruise control. To use the
attack detection method in [7] for such a vehicle system
with multiple operating speeds, one could conservatively
train one set of transient fault model parameters at the
maximum operating speed, and use it for all operating speeds
at runtime. However, with those model parameters, the attack
detection would not be effective at lower operating speeds
because we observe that there is a correlation between the
vehicle’s speed and the worst-case noise bound (i.e., at a
lower speed, the speed sensor noise tends to be smaller,
so is the worst-case noise bound). At a lower speed, one
could use more precise transient fault model parameters to
increase the attack detection performance while preserving
the soundness of the attack detection.
In this paper, we focus on addressing the problems of
the existing transient fault model, and propose an adaptive
method designed to make the transient fault model adaptive
to the current operating mode of the system. To do this, we
propose an automatic method to train transient fault model
parameters to construct the lookup table for the adaptive
transient fault model parameter selection. We conduct a realworld case study using data obtained from an unmanned
ground vehicle called Jackal [11], and demonstrate the
effectiveness of our proposed system in attack detection for
various sensor attack scenarios.
II. P ROBLEM F ORMULATION AND P RELIMINARIES
We consider a system with multiple sensors that measures
the same physical variables. Before they are fused together
to be sent to the system’s controller, the attack detection is
performed to detect and discard the attacked sensors. In the
next subsection, the sensor model that is used for sensor
fusion and attack detection in this work is explained.

A. Abstract Sensor Model
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Multiple redundant sensor values can be fused together to
provide a better estimate value to a controller. To perform
sensor fusion, the first thing to consider might be the choice
of a sensor model. In this paper, we consider the abstract
sensor model [4], [5], [12]–[15]. Unlike probabilistic sensor
models [16], the abstract sensor model does not assume any
noise distributions [7]. The abstract sensor model is well
suited for the worst-case analysis of sensor behavior such as
attack detection [7]. Marzullo has proposed an interval-based
fault tolerance fusion algorithm [4], where the accuracy of
those algorithms is better than individual sensor inputs, and
the fusion interval size is bounded if the number of faulty
sensors are bounded. An abstract sensor is represented by
an interval [y − , y + ], which is made by error bound
 and sensor measurement y. The length of an interval
determines the accuracy of the sensor. In this way, each
sensor measurement is converted to an interval, and the
Marzullo’s fusion algorithm produces a fusion interval with
respect to the assumption on the maximum number of faulty
sensors [4]. This method can also be used as a conservative
way to detect sensor attacks [7].
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Figure 1: Example plot of error bound vs. e/w for the left
encoder of Jackal robot system.
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B. Attack Detection with the Transient Fault Model
Extending the abstract sensor model, the transient fault
model has been developed to differentiate mere transient
faults from sensor attacks [7]. The transient fault model
(TFM) for a sensor is represented by three parameters
(, e, w) where i and ei respectively represent the error
bound and the maximum number of transient faults per
given window wi . The key concept of the attack detection method [7] is two types of pairwise comparisons of
inconsistency between sensors: weak inconsistency (WI) and
strong inconsistency (SI). WI between two sensors at a
certain time means that at least one of the sensors provides a
faulty measurement at that time. WI happens if the abstract
measurements (i.e., intervals) of the two sensors do not
overlap with each other. SI between two sensors at a certain
time means that at least one of the sensors is non-transiently
faulty at that time, thus considered to be attacked. SI happens
when WI happens more frequently than a certain threshold.
The paper [7] also suggests the scheme to obtain the
sensor’s TFM parameters (, e, w) from training data because sensor manufactures may not provide such model
parameters. To find the values for the parameters, one first
needs to analyze the sensor noise of training data. In a
given window size w, the transient fault number indicates the
number of data points that are greater than the error bound
. The maximum number of transient faults in a window
becomes the parameter e. To select the best parameter set,
a graph is drawn by varying the error bound (e.g., Fig. 1)
and used to choose the knee point of the graph as the TFM
parameter [7].

Figure 2: Example of attack detection using TFM.

Fig. 1 shows the example plot obtained from the left
encoder of Jackal Robot, which will be explained in detail
in Section IV. In Fig. 1, each color of the line represents
the window size. The point to consider is where the slope
rapidly changes, which is called the knee point. The knee
point for the window size of 100 becomes where the error
bound is 0.04 in Fig. 1. Thus, we determine the sensor’s
error bound to be 0.04 for this window size. The calculated
TFM parameters for different window sizes are also listed
in Table I. It is important to select and use proper TFM
parameter values because the attack detection performance
is affected by the parameters.
Fig. 2 shows an example to explain how the attack
detection method using TFM works to detect the attack. First
of all, the interval is constructed for each sensor using its
sensor measurement and error bound for each time round as
shown in the top of Fig. 2. The vertical dotted line indicates
where the true value is. When intervals do not intersect with
each other at a certain time, WI occurs, as there is an edge
between sensor s1 and s2 in the WI graph at t = 1 in Fig.
2. Suppose that for each sensor, at most one fault is allowed
within a time window of size 3 (i.e., e = 1, w = 3). At
time 3, three occurrences of WI between sensors s1 and s2
are observed during the last three consecutive rounds. This
implies that at least one sensor between s1 and s2 does not
conform to its transient fault model. Thus, SI between s1
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Figure 3: Sensor data for the example scenario and attack
in GPS.
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Figure 4: The attack detection result of the existing system.

and s2 occurs at time 3, and an attack detection alarm is
raised.

attack) present in the system. In Fig. 4, the result shows
that the existing system does not detect the attack present
in the GPS signal in this attack scenario.

C. Motivation and Example

D. Problem Statements

In this subsection, we illustrate a motivating example
where the attack detection fails due to the use of the
conservative TFM parameter in a multiple operating mode
system. To illustrate this example, we use the data from
the Jackal robot system to be explained in Section IV, and
perform transient fault modeling as shown in Fig. 1.
We consider a multiple operating mode system and an example scenario where the system’s reference speed decreases
from 1 m/s to 0.4 m/s. We examine the consequence of the
existing attack detection system [7] which uses the fixed
conservative TFM parameter.
The data for the example scenario is collected by changing
the vehicle’s speed from 1.0 m/s to 0.4 m/s as shown in
Fig. 3, which shows the sensor measurements for left and
right encoders and GPS. A simulated bias attack (magnitude
of 0.22) is added to the GPS data when the system runs at
the low speed mode (0.4 m/s), as shown at the bottom graph
in Fig. 3.
Fig. 4 shows the result of attack detection using the
existing system [7] with the window size of 100. Fig. 4
shows the number of WI occurrences (i.e., y axis) and the
red line representing the threshold of the number of WI
occurrences to raise SI (which is the sum of the number
of faults allowed for two sensors), where:
• WI (L. enc, R. enc): WI between left encoder and right
encoder
• WI (L. enc, GPS): WI between left encoder and GPS
• WI (R. enc, GPS): WI between right encoder and GPS
If the number of occurrences of WI goes over the red line in
the graph, it indicates that there is an SI detected, meaning
that there exists a non-transient fault (assumed to be an

In this subsection, we formulate our problem statements.
The first problem that we consider is as follows:
Problem 1: Adapt the attack detection method to use the
transient fault model parameters which are suitable to the
system’s operating mode.
To address this problem, we, in the next section, propose
an attack detection method which uses a lookup table that
contains the values of parameters for the transient fault
model, which are trained for each operating speed. As the
transient fault modeling is currently done manually, it is
necessary to automate the transient fault modeling process
to perform it multiple times for each operating speed. Thus,
the second problem that we consider is as follows:
Problem 2: Given a training data, automate the transient
fault modeling procedure (i.e., heuristic algorithm to find the
knee point)
To address this problem, we propose an automatic transient fault modeling method to be explained in the next
section.
III. A DAPTIVE T RANSIENT FAULT M ODEL
In this section, we explain our proposed system using an
adaptive transient fault model. Our proposed system uses the
lookup table which contains multiple TFM parameter values
trained for the different operating modes of the system. To
construct such a lookup table, we propose an automatic
process for the transient fault modeling which has been done
only manually in the existing work [4].
A. Detection Scheme with Adaptive Transient Fault Model
Fig. 5 shows the architecture of our proposed system. First
of all, the measured values from sensors are sampled at a
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Figure 5: The architecture of our proposed system.
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Figure 6: A sample graph of  vs. e/w.

certain sampling rate. For example, in our case study to be
explained in the next section, we use 10 Hz of sampling
rate because the attack detection is performed based on the
lowest frequency among sensors (i.e., GPS in our system).
The system uses sampled measurements and the parameters
from the lookup table to detect if there is any attack present
to the system. Then, when the reference speed changes, the
values for TFM parameters are also updated according to
the system’s reference speed. When the speed is not listed
on the lookup table, the system uses the parameter values of
the lowest speed which is higher than the reference speed in
the lookup table. In the next subsection, we will explain how
to construct the lookup table, which is used in the adaptive
TFM parameter selection.
B. Automating the Transient Fault Modeling Process
Selecting the suitable values for TFM parameters is important for the attack detection performance. In the previous
work [4], transient fault modeling has been done manually.
Therefore, it is necessary to repeat the modeling process
for the different sets of training data in order to construct
the lookup table for a multiple operating mode system.
Therefore, we propose an automatic method to find the
proper values for parameters using the characteristic of knee
point (i.e., rapid increase of slope), thus reducing the manual
efforts for transient fault modeling.
Fig. 6 shows a sample plot of the proportion of faults in
a window (e/w) against the error bound (), which can be

drawn following the description on transient fault modeling
in Section II and in [4]. Let max denote the maximum value
of the error bound. To find the knee point of the graph, we
make the descending diagonal line from the point (0, 1) to
the point (max , 0) in the graph, which has the function of
1
x + 1. According to the Lemma 4 of [4], we
y = − max
only consider the points under 0.5 of e/w as the parameter
values because otherwise no detection can be made by the
attack detector. From each original point of the graph, we
calculate the perpendicular distance to the diagonal line (i.e.,
the shortest distance from a point to the diagonal line).
Finally, we select the point as the TFM parameter which
has the longest perpendicular distance. The reason is that, as
decreases in the graph, the perpendicular distance gradually
increases at first, becomes the maximum at the knee point,
and decreases again after passing that point. In the next
section, we will show the result of applying this automatic
transient fault modeling method to a real world data set
obtained from an unmanned ground vehicle.
IV. C ASE S TUDY
In this section, we evaluate our proposed system by conducting a real-world case study using an unmanned ground
vehicle called Jackal [12]. We compare the performance of
our system with that of the existing system [7].
A. Jackal Robot System Description
Jackal in Fig. 7 is an electric unmanned ground vehicle
that has many sensors including two encoders, IMU, and
GPS [12]. We use both encoder sensors for the left and
right wheel and GPS to measure the velocity of Jackal.
To evaluate our proposed system explained in the previous
section, we first gather data for each sensor by driving Jackal
on straight lines at a constant speed. Both encoder sensors
provide measurements at 20 Hz and GPS sensor offers
measurements at 10 Hz. The attack detection is performed
at 10 Hz which is the lowest frequency of the sensors.
B. Lookup Table
This subsection presents the constructed lookup table for
the Jackal robot system applying the automatic transient fault
modeling method of Section III. We ran the Jackal robot
in various operating modes (i.e., different reference speeds

Table I: TFM parameters of the Jackal Robot’s sensors for different running speeds.
(a) Parameters for left encoder.
v
0.4
0.7
1.0
1.3
1.6

m/s
m/s
m/s
m/s
m/s


0.04
0.09
0.1
0.14
0.16

w = 25
e
e/w
5
0.2
6
0.24
4
0.16
3
0.12
4
0.16


0.04
0.07
0.1
0.13
0.16

w = 50
e
e/w
7
0.14
7
0.14
7
0.14
7
0.14
5
0.1


0.04
0.07
0.1
0.13
0.16

w = 100
e
e/w
12
0.12
12
0.12
9
0.09
8
0.08
7
0.07


0.04
0.07
0.1
0.13
0.16

w = 200
e
e/w
19
0.095
19
0.095
13
0.065
10
0.05
10
0.05

(b) Parameters for right encoder.
v
0.4
0.7
1.0
1.3
1.6

m/s
m/s
m/s
m/s
m/s


0.04
0.07
0.1
0.13
0.16

w = 25
e
5
4
3
3
43

e/w
0.2
0.16
0.12
0.12
0.12


0.04
0.07
0.1
0.13
0.16

w = 50
e
e/w
8
0.16
7
0.14
4
0.08
4
0.08
5
0.1


0.04
0.07
0.1
0.13
0.16

w = 100
e
e/w
12
0.12
10
0.1
7
0.07
6
0.06
6
0.06


0.04
0.07
0.09
0.13
0.16

w = 200
e
e/w
18
0.09
14
0.07
11 0.055
8
0.04
7
0.05


0.08
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.14

w = 200
e
e/w
36
0.18
18
0.09
20
0.1
19 0.095
16
0.08

(c) Parameters for GPS.
v
0.4
0.7
1.0
1.3
1.6

m/s
m/s
m/s
m/s
m/s


0.12
0.14
0.16
0.16
0.2

w = 25
e
e/w
2
0.08
2
0.08
3
0.12
4
0.16
4
0.16


0.11
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.16

w = 50
e
e/w
6
0.12
7
0.14
7
0.14
8
0.16
9
0.18

such as 0.4 m/s, 0.7 m/s, 1.0 m/s, 1.3 m/s and 1.6 m/s) and
collected the training data from the runs. The transient fault
modeling result for all speeds is summarized in Table I,
where v denotes the speed that varies from 0.4 m/s to
1.6 m/s, and the window size w varies from 25 to 200.
Table I demonstrates that different speeds yield different
TFM parameters. We observe the relationship between the
error bound () and the speed (v) such that the error bound
increases as the speed becomes faster. We also observe that
the larger window size yields a smaller error bound.
This lookup table is used to select the proper TFM
parameter values given a reference speed. If the reference
speed is not contained in the lookup table, our system
chooses the parameters of the next higher speed rather than
the next lower speed. The reason for this is to be sound in
the attack detection and avoid any false alarms. For instance,
if the system’s reference speed is 0.5 m/s, the parameters of
0.7 m/s are used for the given reference speed because the
lookup table (Table I) contains no entry for 0.5 m/s.
To validate the results obtained from our automatic modeling method proposed, we also manually conducted the TFM
parameter selection for all the cases above. We observed that
the result of the automatic method coincides with the one
that is found manually in all cases.
C. Evaluation on Motivating Example
We recall the motivating example in Section II. In this
subsection, we compare our proposed system with the exist-


0.11
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.16

w = 100
e
e/w
11
0.11
8
0.08
9
0.09
11
0.11
11
0.11

ing system [7] using the motivating example. The existing
system uses the most conservative TFM parameter values
such that the error bounds are 0.1, 0.1 and 0.14 for left
and right encoders and GPS respectively. This system uses
these parameter values for all operating speeds such as 1
m/s and 0.4 m/s. In contrast, our proposed system uses
the adapted TFM parameter values according to the given
reference speed to the system. At 1 m/s, our system uses the
same TFM parameters to the ones that the existing system
uses while our system at 0.4 m/s uses the error bounds of
0.04, 0.04 and 0.11 for left and right encoders and GPS
respectively. We note that both the existing system and our
proposed system make no false alarm in the normal case
where there is no attack present.
Now, we consider the attack scenario of the motivating
example, where the biased attack (magnitude of 0.22) is
added in GPS as shown in Fig. 3. In contrast to the existing
system which uses the most conservative TFM parameters,
our proposed system uses the adapted TFM parameters
according to the system’s reference speed. Fig. 8 shows the
number of WI occurrences as the result of attack detection.
The red line indicates the threshold to raise an alarm for
attack detection. We observe in Fig. 8 that our proposed
system quickly detects the attack of this example while the
existing system could not detect it as shown in Fig. 4.
Moreover, we also consider another scenario, a variation
of the motivating example, where the random attack (of
uniform distribution with magnitude of 0.22) is manifested
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Figure 8: The attack detection result of our system for the
example attack scenario.
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(a) The attack detection result of the existing system.
The number of WI (L. enc, R. enc)

40

Speed (m/s)

20

1
0.5
0

0

0

50

100
Time (s)

150

200

Table II: False alarm rate.
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Figure 9: Random attack in GPS.

Detector
False Alarm Rate (%)

0

40

Proposed System
0%

instead of the biased attack. The magnitude of the attack
is decided to be roughly as large as the size of the largest
error bound (i.e., GPS). Fig. 9 shows the GPS measurements
where the random attack is added. Fig. 10a shows that
the existing system does not detect any attack while our
proposed system adapts to the speed and uses the proper
parameter values, thus being capable of detecting the attack
of this scenario as shown in Fig. 10b.
Besides the biased and the random attacks, there might be
a type of attacks where the attacker has the full knowledge
of the system including the detection scheme [7], [8]. This
kind of attack may be able to remain undetected. Thus, such
attacks are not considered in our case study. However, note
that the attacker’s capability should be limited in order to
remain stealthy from the detector (e.g., conforming to the
sensor’s TFM).
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(b) The attack detection result of our system.

Figure 10: The attack detection result in the random attack
scenario.
Table III: Detection rate.
(a) Detection rate (%) for biased attack.
Magnitude
0.33
0.22
0.11

Existing System
100 %
13.8 %
5.5 %

Proposed System
100 %
100 %
58.3%

(b) Detection rate (%) for random attack.
Magnitude
0.33
0.22
0.11

Existing System
97.2 %
2.7 %
0%

Proposed System
100 %
100 %
11.1 %

D. Further Evaluation
To provide a more thorough comparison, we employ 12
different test data sets obtained from the multiple runs of
the Jackal robot system where the operating mode changes
from the high speed mode (i.e., 1 m/s) to the low speed
mode (i.e., 0.4 m/s). First of all, we calculate the false alarm
rate for both systems in the normal operation where there is

no attack present. Table II summarizes the result that both
systems did not make any false alarms.
Now, we calculate the detection rate for both detection
systems against random1 and biased attacks of varied mag1 The

uniform distribution is used.

nitudes (0.11, 0.22 and 0.33) manifesting in one of the
sensors. Table III shows the detection rates for both types
of attacks of different magnitudes. When the magnitude of
the attack is large (i.e., 0.33), both systems have an equally
good performance in the case of biased attacks, while our
proposed system performs slightly better than the existing
system for random attacks. The reason is that since the
attack magnitude is large, both systems are able to easily
detect the attacks. On the other hand, when the magnitude
of the attack is small (i.e., 0.11), both systems can detect less
attacks, but we can see that our proposed system has a better
performance than the existing system. Lastly, if the attack
magnitude is medium, our proposed system outperforms the
existing system.
V. C ONCLUSION
In this paper, we addressed the problem of sensor attack
detection for multiple operating mode systems. The existing
system uses the most conservative TFM parameter to be
sound in detection, thus not being effective to use for a
multiple operating mode system. We proposed the adaptive
transient fault model to address the problem of the existing
system. Our system uses the suitable parameter values in
accordance with the reference speed (i.e., system’s operating
mode) using the lookup table method. The lookup table
is constructed using the automatic transient fault modeling
method which is presented in this paper. By conducting a
real-world case study, we demonstrated that our proposed
system outperforms the existing system in various attack
scenarios.
For our future work, we plan to study the online learning
scheme for finding the proper TFM parameter values at
runtime. Additionally, we plan to incorporate system dynamics in our attack detection system to improve the detection
performance against various stealthy and collusion attacks.
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